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Abstract 
Virtually every legal system specifies a variety of burdens of proof for different kinds of 
claims, and then secures each specification with another, nominally unrelated rule 
pertaining to relitigation. In criminal law, where a prosecutor might be required to prove 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecutor is prevented from repeatedly drawing 
from the urn, as it were, by the familiar and nearly universal rule of double jeopardy. We 
suggest that if law were to weaken the protection, or more likely to permit the defendant 
to waive the double jeopardy protection, both private and social benefits might follow. 
The benefits derive from the notion that with a simple double jeopardy rule, the 
prosecutor – like most people who take a test knowing that there is no opportunity for 
retesting – will overinvest in preparation. This starting point also illuminates relitigation, 
or retesting, in other areas, far from criminal law. Thus, deficit spending by a legislature 
can be understood as a product of a system in which spending proposals that are 
rebuffed can be pushed forward again, while those that pass are often irreversible. Our 
focus is on the idea that a prosecutor might offer defendants the option of waiving their 
double jeopardy protection, in return for a reduction in prosecutorial investment in the 
“first” trial and perhaps other benefits. In response, innocent defendants might be more 
likely to accept the prosecutor’s offer, in which case there will be socially beneficial 
sorting of criminal defendants. 
 
